Geodesic
Provable security of digital signatures in the tamper-proof device model
Diskretnaya Matematika, Tome 20 (2008) no. 3, pp. 147-159.

Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

Proofs of security for practical signature schemes are known in idealised models only. In the present paper, we consider the tamper-proof device model that does not use ideal primitives. Instead of access to a random oracle each participant is provided with tamper-proof device implementing a private-key cryptosystem. The hash-value of a message to be signed is submitted to the tamper-proof device for encryption and this encrypted value is used in the signature generation algorithm. In this model, we prove, modulo a physical assumption, a necessary and sufficient condition for security of the GOST signature scheme. 
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N. P. Varnovskii. Provable security of digital signatures in the tamper-proof device model. Diskretnaya Matematika, Tome 20 (2008) no. 3, pp. 147-159. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/DM_2008_20_3_a13/

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