Differencialʹnye uravneniâ, Tome 36 (2000) no. 12, pp. 1658-1664
Citer cet article
È. R. Smol'yakov. A Search for the Always Existing Strongest Equilibrium in Coalition-Free Differential Games. Differencialʹnye uravneniâ, Tome 36 (2000) no. 12, pp. 1658-1664. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/DE_2000_36_12_a9/
@article{DE_2000_36_12_a9,
author = {\`E. R. Smol'yakov},
title = {A {Search} for the {Always} {Existing} {Strongest} {Equilibrium} in {Coalition-Free} {Differential} {Games}},
journal = {Differencialʹnye uravneni\^a},
pages = {1658--1664},
year = {2000},
volume = {36},
number = {12},
language = {ru},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/DE_2000_36_12_a9/}
}
TY - JOUR
AU - È. R. Smol'yakov
TI - A Search for the Always Existing Strongest Equilibrium in Coalition-Free Differential Games
JO - Differencialʹnye uravneniâ
PY - 2000
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EP - 1664
VL - 36
IS - 12
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%G ru
%F DE_2000_36_12_a9
