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@article{DE_2000_36_12_a9, author = {\`E. R. Smol'yakov}, title = {A {Search} for the {Always} {Existing} {Strongest} {Equilibrium} in {Coalition-Free} {Differential} {Games}}, journal = {Differencialʹnye uravneni\^a}, pages = {1658--1664}, publisher = {mathdoc}, volume = {36}, number = {12}, year = {2000}, language = {ru}, url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/DE_2000_36_12_a9/} }
TY - JOUR AU - È. R. Smol'yakov TI - A Search for the Always Existing Strongest Equilibrium in Coalition-Free Differential Games JO - Differencialʹnye uravneniâ PY - 2000 SP - 1658 EP - 1664 VL - 36 IS - 12 PB - mathdoc UR - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/DE_2000_36_12_a9/ LA - ru ID - DE_2000_36_12_a9 ER -
È. R. Smol'yakov. A Search for the Always Existing Strongest Equilibrium in Coalition-Free Differential Games. Differencialʹnye uravneniâ, Tome 36 (2000) no. 12, pp. 1658-1664. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/DE_2000_36_12_a9/