Geodesic
A Search for the Always Existing Strongest Equilibrium in Coalition-Free Differential Games
Differencialʹnye uravneniâ, Tome 36 (2000) no. 12, pp. 1658-1664 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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     author = {\`E. R. Smol'yakov},
     title = {A {Search} for the {Always} {Existing} {Strongest} {Equilibrium} in {Coalition-Free} {Differential} {Games}},
     journal = {Differencialʹnye uravneni\^a},
     pages = {1658--1664},
     year = {2000},
     volume = {36},
     number = {12},
     language = {ru},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/DE_2000_36_12_a9/}
}
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È. R. Smol'yakov. A Search for the Always Existing Strongest Equilibrium in Coalition-Free Differential Games. Differencialʹnye uravneniâ, Tome 36 (2000) no. 12, pp. 1658-1664. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/DE_2000_36_12_a9/