Geodesic
Difference Stackelberg game theoretic model of innovations management in universities
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 15 (2022), pp. 96-108.

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We built a two-level difference game theoretic model "federal state universities" in open-loop strategies. The leading player (Principal) is the state or its representative bodies, the followers (agents) are competing a la Cournot universities. The agents assign their resources to the development of new online teaching courses which are considered as their innovative investments. An optimality principle from the point of view of agents is a set of Nash equilibria in their game in normal form, and from the point of view of the Principal it is a solution of the direct or inverse Stackelberg game "Principal-agents". The respective dynamic problems of conflict control are solved by means of the Pontryagin maximum principle and simulation modeling. The received results are analyzed, and the main conclusion is that two-level system of control of the innovative educational products promotion in the universities is necessary.
Keywords: difference Stackelberg games, economic corruption, resource allocation, simulation modeling. 
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Vassily Yu. Kalachev; Guennady A. Ougolnitsky; Anatoly B. Usov. Difference Stackelberg game theoretic model of innovations management in universities. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 15 (2022), pp. 96-108. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2022_15_a8/

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