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Tax authority and taxpayers: how does mutual collecting of information affect the effectiveness of tax control
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 15 (2022), pp. 155-177.

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Lots of works have been devoted to the modelling of tax control. In the classic game-theoretic formulation, the subject of study is the interaction between tax authority and taxpayers. However, along with such attitude to the problem, some works allow us to study auxiliary problems related to tax collection and tax control. Two of these issues are worth mentioning. The first is the dissemination of information about future tax audits among the taxable population. The second is the gathering and analysis of information on the tendency of taxpayers to evasion. It was shown that both processes can be used to adjust the tax authority's strategy and optimize audits in order to improve tax collection. However, the mutual collecting of information on tax audits by the taxpayers and the tax authority decreases the total tax revenue. The study of formulated problem is accompanied by the modelling of both processes, their simulation, and comparative analysis of the results.
Keywords: tax control, tax evasions, risk propensity, structured network, Bayesian approach, mutual collecting of information. 
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Suriya Sh. Kumacheva; Galina A. Tomilina. Tax authority and taxpayers: how does mutual collecting of information affect the effectiveness of tax control. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 15 (2022), pp. 155-177. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2022_15_a12/

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