Geodesic
Models of optimal control in Tullock rent-seeking game
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 13 (2020), pp. 132-141.

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The paper constructs and investigates the models of the optimal control in the Tullock rent-seeking game. There are two types of control in the paper: an unlimited, but expensive resource, and a cheap, but an infinitely small resource. Before the game starts, players discuss parameters of the game, and then choose their strategies simultaneously and independently, competing for better rent. We consider two types of players and two types of communication and analyze combinations.
Keywords: optimal control, Tullock rent-seeking game, parametrized equilibrium, beliefs. 
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Denis N. Fedyanin. Models of optimal control in Tullock rent-seeking game. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 13 (2020), pp. 132-141. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2020_13_a6/

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