Geodesic
Mechanisms of struggle with corruption in dynamic social and private interests coordination engine models
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 12 (2019), pp. 140-150.

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A consideration of economic corruption is introduced in the dynamic social and private interests coordination engine (SPICE) models related to the resource allocation. The investigation is based on the hierarchical game theoretic approach in principal-agents systems. From the point of view of the agents a differential game in normal form arises which results in Nash equilibrium. The addition of a principal forms an inverse differential Stackelberg game in open-loop strategies. The related optimal control problems are solved by the Pontryagin maximum principle together with a method of qualitatively representative scenarios of simulation modeling. The algorithms of building of the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are proposed, the numerical examples are described and analyzed.
Keywords: social and private interests coordination engine (SPICE) models, inverse differential Stackelberg games, corruption, principal-agents systems. 
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Olga I. Gorbaneva; Anatoly B. Usov; Gennady A. Ougolnitsky. Mechanisms of struggle with corruption in dynamic social and private interests coordination engine models. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 12 (2019), pp. 140-150. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2019_12_a7/

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