Geodesic
Networks structure, equilibria, and adjustment dynamics in network games with nonhomogeneous players
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 12 (2019), pp. 128-139.

Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

In this paper, we consider the following problem — what affects the Nash equilibrium amount of investment in knowledge when some agents of the complete graph enter another full one. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how game agents will behave when deciding whether to enter the other net, what conditions and externalities affect it and how the level of future equilibrium amount of investments in knowledge can be predicted.
Keywords: network, network game, Nash equilibrium, externality, productivity, innovation cluster. 
@article{CGTM_2019_12_a6,
     author = {Maria Garmash and Alyona Utkina and Alexei Korolev},
     title = {Networks structure, equilibria, and adjustment dynamics in network games with nonhomogeneous players},
     journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
     pages = {128--139},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {12},
     year = {2019},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2019_12_a6/}
}
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Maria Garmash
AU  - Alyona Utkina
AU  - Alexei Korolev
TI  - Networks structure, equilibria, and adjustment dynamics in network games with nonhomogeneous players
JO  - Contributions to game theory and management
PY  - 2019
SP  - 128
EP  - 139
VL  - 12
PB  - mathdoc
UR  - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2019_12_a6/
LA  - en
ID  - CGTM_2019_12_a6
ER  - 
%0 Journal Article
%A Maria Garmash
%A Alyona Utkina
%A Alexei Korolev
%T Networks structure, equilibria, and adjustment dynamics in network games with nonhomogeneous players
%J Contributions to game theory and management
%D 2019
%P 128-139
%V 12
%I mathdoc
%U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2019_12_a6/
%G en
%F CGTM_2019_12_a6
Maria Garmash; Alyona Utkina; Alexei Korolev. Networks structure, equilibria, and adjustment dynamics in network games with nonhomogeneous players. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 12 (2019), pp. 128-139. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2019_12_a6/

[1] Alcacer J., Chung W., “Location strategies and knowledge spillovers”, Management Science, 53:5 (2007), 760–776 | DOI

[2] Breschi S., Lissoni F., “Knowledge spillovers and local innovation systems: a critical survey”, Industrial and corporate change, 10:4 (2001), 975–1005 | DOI

[3] Chung W., Alcácer J., “Knowledge seeking and location choice of foreign direct investment in the United States”, Management Science, 48:12 (2002), 1534–1554 | DOI

[4] Cooke P., “Regional innovation systems, clusters, and the knowledge economy”, Industrial and Corporate Change, 10:4 (2001), 945–974 | DOI | MR

[5] Jaffe A. B., Trajtenberg M., Henderson R., “Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers as evidenced by patent citations”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108:3 (1993), 577–598 | DOI

[6] Katz M. L., Shapiro C., “Network externalities, competition, and compatibility”, The American Economic Review, 75:3 (1985), 424–440 | MR

[7] Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., “Network game with production and knowledge externalities”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 8 (2015), 199–222 | MR

[8] Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., “Knowledge externalities and production in network: game equilibria, types of nodes, network formation”, International Journal of Computational Economics and Econometrics, 7:4 (2017), 323–358 | DOI

[9] Matveenko V., Korolev A., Zhdanova M., “Game equilibria and unification dynamics in networks with heterogeneous agents”, International Journal of Engineering Business Management, 9 (2017), 1–17 | DOI