Stackelberg equilibrium of opinion dynamics game in social network with two influence nodes
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 12 (2019), pp. 366-386.

Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

The alteration of opinions of individuals in groups over time is a particular common phenomenon in social life. Taking into account the influence of homogeneous members and some special influential persons, an opinion dynamics game is established. In a social network, two special influence nodes pursuing their certain goals with the process of influencing the opinions of other normal nodes in discrete time is considered. From the perspective of non-cooperation, Stackelberg equilibrium is selected as the solution of the opinion dynamics game. Given distinct information knowledge, players will derive different equilibrium strategies. The open-loop and feedback information configurations are investigated. In the two-person non-cooperative dynamic game, techniques of Pontryagin's minimum principle and dynamic programming are adopted to derive the equilibrium levels of influence for influence nodes and the equilibrium opinions for other normal nodes in the network. To compute and compare the various equilibrium concepts under different information structures, numerical results are presented for different scenarios.
Keywords: social network, influence, opinion dynamics, Stackelberg equilibrium.
@article{CGTM_2019_12_a22,
     author = {Mengke Zhen},
     title = {Stackelberg equilibrium of opinion dynamics game in social network with two influence nodes},
     journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
     pages = {366--386},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {12},
     year = {2019},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2019_12_a22/}
}
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mengke Zhen
TI  - Stackelberg equilibrium of opinion dynamics game in social network with two influence nodes
JO  - Contributions to game theory and management
PY  - 2019
SP  - 366
EP  - 386
VL  - 12
PB  - mathdoc
UR  - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2019_12_a22/
LA  - en
ID  - CGTM_2019_12_a22
ER  - 
%0 Journal Article
%A Mengke Zhen
%T Stackelberg equilibrium of opinion dynamics game in social network with two influence nodes
%J Contributions to game theory and management
%D 2019
%P 366-386
%V 12
%I mathdoc
%U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2019_12_a22/
%G en
%F CGTM_2019_12_a22
Mengke Zhen. Stackelberg equilibrium of opinion dynamics game in social network with two influence nodes. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 12 (2019), pp. 366-386. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2019_12_a22/

[1] Acemoglu D., Ozdaglar A., “Opinion dynamics and learning in social networks”, Dynamic Games and Applications, 1:1 (2011), 3–49 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[2] Avrachenkov K. E., Kondratev A. Y., Mazalov V. V., “Cooperative game theory approaches for network partitioning”, International Computing and Combinatorics Conference, 2017, 591–602 | MR | Zbl

[3] Barabanov I. N., Korgin N. A., Novikov D. A., Chkhartishvili A. G., “Dynamic models of informational control in social networks”, Automation and Remote Control, 71:11 (2010), 2417–2426 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[4] Basar T., Olsder G. J., Games and dynamic games, Siam, Bangkok, 1999 | MR

[5] Buechel B., Hellmann T., Klößner S., “Opinion dynamics and wisdom under conformity”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 52 (2015), 240–257 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[6] Bure V. M., Parilina E. M., Sedakov A. A., “Consensus in social networks with heterogeneous agents and two centers of influence”, Stability and Control Processes, 2015 International Conference, in Memory of VI Zubov (SCP), 2015, 233–236 | MR

[7] Bure V. M., Parilina E. M., Sedakov A. A., “Consensus in a social network with two principals”, Automation and Remote Control, 78:8 (2017), 1489–1499 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[8] Dandekar P., Goel A., Lee D. T., “Biased assimilation, homophily, and the dynamics of polarization”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110:15 (2013), 5791–5796 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[9] DeGroot M. H., “Reaching a consensus”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69:345 (1974), 118–121 | DOI | Zbl

[10] Etesami S. R., Ba{ş}ar T., “Game-theoretic analysis of the Hegselmann-Krause model for opinion dynamics in finite dimensions”, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 60:7 (2015), 1886–1897 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[11] Friedkin N. E., Johnsen E. C., “Social influence and opinions”, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 15:3–4 (1990), 193–206 | DOI

[12] Friedkin N. E., Johnsen E. C., “Social influence networks and opinion change”, Advances in Group Processes, 16 (1999), 1–29 | MR

[13] Ghaderi J., Srikant R., “Opinion dynamics in social networks with stubborn agents: Equilibrium and convergence rate”, Automatica, 50:12 (2014), 3209–3215 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[14] Golub B., Jackson M. O., “Naive learning in social networks and the wisdom of crowds”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2:1 (2010), 112–49 | DOI

[15] Gubanov D. A., Novikov D. A., Chkhartishvili A. G., “Informational influence and information control models in social networks”, Automation and Remote Control, 72:7 (2011), 1557–1597 | DOI | MR

[16] Haurie A., Krawczyk J. B., Zaccour G., Dynamic noncooperative game theory, World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore, 2012 | MR

[17] Hegselmann R., Krause U., “Opinion dynamics and bounded confidence models, analysis, and simulation”, Journal of artificial societies and social simulation, 5:3 (2002)

[18] Krawczyk J. B., Tidball M., “A discrete-time dynamic game of seasonal water allocation”, Journal of optimization theory and applications, 128:2 (2006), 411–429 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[19] Sedakov A. A., Zhen M., “Opinion dynamics game in a social network with two influence nodes”, Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Applied Mathematics. Computer Science. Control Processes, 15:1 (2019), 118–125 | MR

[20] Wang C., Han H., Han J., “A New Network Feature Affects the Intervention Performance on Public Opinion Dynamic Networks”, Scientific reports, 9:1 (2019), 5089 | DOI

[21] Zachary W. W., “An Information Flow Model for Conflict and Fission in Small Groups”, Journal of Anthropological Research, 33:4 (1977), 452–473 | DOI