Geodesic
Effects of board social capital on corporate performance: evidence from Russia
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 12 (2019), pp. 49-69.

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Increasingly, researchers, studying board of directors' characteristics, are coming to understanding that connections and relationships that directors establish with internal and external stakeholders have a certain value for the company. Board's connections and relationships are considered in terms of concept of social capital of the board of directors. This study is focused on such an element of board social capital, as multiple directorship positions. Based on the existing studies in this field, research hypothesis were formulated and empirical study was conducted in order to set the relationship between multiple directorship positions and performance of the companies.
Keywords: board of directors, social capital of board of directors, multiple directorship positions, performance. 
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Irina Berezinets; Yuliya Ilina; Anastasiya Loginova. Effects of board social capital on corporate performance: evidence from Russia. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 12 (2019), pp. 49-69. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2019_12_a2/

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