Geodesic
Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution for two-stage network games
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 11 (2018), pp. 66-72.

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In this paper, two-stage network games are studied. At first stage of the game players form a network, while at second stage they choose strategies according to the network realized at the first stage. However, there are two kinds of two-stage networks. The first is a special class of two-stage network games when players have the opportunity to revised their network which they formed before. And the second is classical two-stage network. Cooperative setting is considered. In the cooperative case, we use Nash Bargaining Solution as a solution concept. It is demonstrated that the Nash Bargaining Solution satisfies the time consistency property for the special class of two-stage network game. But its not true for a classical two-stage network game.
Keywords: network, time-consistency, Nash Bargaining solution. 
@article{CGTM_2018_11_a5,
     author = {Jie Junnan},
     title = {Dynamic {Nash} {Bargaining} {Solution} for two-stage network games},
     journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
     pages = {66--72},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {11},
     year = {2018},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2018_11_a5/}
}
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Jie Junnan. Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution for two-stage network games. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 11 (2018), pp. 66-72. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2018_11_a5/

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