Geodesic
Games with incomplete information on the both sides and with public signal on the state of the game
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 10 (2017), pp. 68-78.

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Supposing that Player 1’s computational power is higher than that of Player 2, we give three examples of different kinds of public signal about the state of a two-person zero-sum game with symmetric incomplete information on both sides (both players do not know the state of the game) where Player 1 due to his computational power learns the state of the game meanwhile it is impossible for Player 2. That is, the game with incomplete information on both sides becomes a game with incomplete information on the side of Player 2. Thus we demonstrate that information about the state of a game may appear not only due to a private signal but as a result of a public signal and asymmetric computational resources of players.
Keywords: zero-sum game; incomplete information; asymmetry; finite automata. 
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Misha Gavrilovich; Victoria Kreps. Games with incomplete information on the both sides and with public signal on the state of the game. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 10 (2017), pp. 68-78. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2017_10_a5/

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