Cooperation in bioresource management problems

Anna N. Rettieva

Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 10 (2017), pp. 245-286.

Résumé

This paper is devoted to overview of the previously available and the author’s own results of cooperative behavior analysis in dynamic games related to bioresource management problems. The methodological schemes to maintain the cooperation are considered and modified. The incentive condition for rational behavior and characteristic function construction method are presented. The question of coalition stability is revised and extended. The cooperative behavior determination schemes for games with asymmetric players are obtained. Some analytical and numerical modelling results for particular dynamic bioresource management problems are presented.

Détail

Keywords: dynamic games, bioresource management problem, Nash equilibrium, cooperative equilibrium, incentive equilibrium, dynamic stability, imputation distribution procedure, incentive conditions for rational behavior, coalition stability, asymmetric players, different planning horizons.

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