Geodesic
A differential game of pollution control with participation of developed and developing countries
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 8 (2015), pp. 64-83 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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In this paper, a 2-player non-cooperative differential game is considered. We assume that he first player is a developed country with linear-quadratic utility function while the second player is a developing country whose utility function explicitely depends on time. Furthermore, the duration of the game is considered to be a random variable which reflects the instability of the economical development of developing countries. In the paper the duration of the game is assumed to be exponentially distributed. The optimal strategies are sought in the class of open-loop strategies.
Keywords: pollution control, differential games, cooperative games, random time horizon. 
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Ekaterina Gromova; Kristina Plekhanova. A differential game of pollution control with participation of developed and developing countries. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 8 (2015), pp. 64-83. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2015_8_a6/

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