Geodesic
Auctions of homogeneous goods: game-theoretic analysis
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 8 (2015), pp. 315-335.

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This paper discusses results on Nash equilibrium and its refinements for several variants of the architecture for oligopolistic markets of homogeneous goods. For different kinds of one-stage and two-stage auctions, we compare the game-theoretic solution with the competitive equilibrium and estimate the loss of social welfare due to producers’ market power. We conclude on the optimal architecture of the market.
Keywords: Game theory; auctions; market power; social welfare. 
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Alexander Vasin; Polina Kartunova. Auctions of homogeneous goods: game-theoretic analysis. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 8 (2015), pp. 315-335. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2015_8_a24/

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