Geodesic
A problem of purpose resource use in two-level control systems
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 7 (2014), pp. 81-92.

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The system including two level players — top and bottom — is considered in the paper. Each of the players have public (purpose) and private (non-purpose) interests. Both players take part of payoff from purpose resource use. The model of resource allocation among the purpose and non-purpose using is investigated for different payoff function classes and for three public gain distribution types. A problem is presented in the form of hierarchical game where the Stackelberg equilibrium is found.
Keywords: resource allocation, two-level control system, purpose use, non-purpose resource use, Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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Olga I. Gorbaneva; Guennady A. Ougolnitsky. A problem of purpose resource use in two-level control systems. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 7 (2014), pp. 81-92. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2014_7_a7/

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