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Stable cooperation in graph-restricted games
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 7 (2014), pp. 271-281 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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In the paper we study stable coalition structures in the games with restrictions on players' cooperation and communication. Restriction on cooperation among players is given by a coalition structure, whereas restriction on their communication is described by a graph. Having both a coalition structure and a graph fixed, a payoff distribution can be calculated based on worth of each coalition of players. We use the concept of stability for a coalition structure similar to Nash stability, assuming that the graph structure is fixed. The results are illustrated with examples.
Keywords: cooperation, graph, characteristic function, stability, Shapley value, Myerson value, ES-value.
Mots-clés : coalition structure 
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Elena Parilina; Artem Sedakov. Stable cooperation in graph-restricted games. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 7 (2014), pp. 271-281. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2014_7_a24/

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