Equilibrium strategies in two-sided mate choice problem with age preferences
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 7 (2014), pp. 142-150.

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In the paper the two-sided mate choice model of Alpern, Katrantzi and Ramsey (2010) is considered. In the model the individuals from two groups (males and females) want to form a couple. It is assumed that the total number of unmated males is greater than the total number of unmated females and the maximum age of males ($m$) is greater than the maximum age of females ($n$). There is steady state distribution for the age of individuals. The aim of each individual is to form a couple with individual of minimum age. We derive analytically the equilibrium threshold strategies and investigate players' payoffs for the case $n=3$ and large $m$.
Keywords: mutual mate choice, equilibrium, threshold strategy.
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Anna A. Ivashko; Elena N. Konovalchikova. Equilibrium strategies in two-sided mate choice problem with age preferences. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 7 (2014), pp. 142-150. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2014_7_a12/

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