Geodesic
Analysing the Folk Theorem for Linked Repeated Games
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 146-164.

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We deal with the linkage of infinitely repeated games. Results are obtained by analysing the relations between the feasible individually rational payoff regions of the isolated games and the linked game. In fact we have to handle geometric problems related to Minkowski sums, intersections and Pareto boundaries of convex sets.
Keywords: asymmetries, convex set, feasible individually rational payoff region, Folk theorem, full cooperation, linking, Minkowski sum, Pareto boundary, tensor game. 
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Henk Folmer; Pierre von Mouche. Analysing the Folk Theorem for Linked Repeated Games. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 146-164. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2013_6_a9/

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