Geodesic
Dynamic Models of Corruption in Hierarchical Control Systems
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 63-74.

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Dynamic game theoretic models of corruption in two- and three-level control systems as well as optimal control problems and their applications to the optimal exploitation of bioresources and water quality control are considered. Several model examples are investigated analytically.
Keywords: corruption, hierarchical control systems, dynamic Stackelberg games, optimal control. 
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Andrey A. Chernushkin; Guennady A. Ougolnitsky; Anatoly B. Usov. Dynamic Models of Corruption in Hierarchical Control Systems. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 63-74. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2013_6_a4/

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