Geodesic
A Simple Way to Obtain the Sufficient Nonemptiness Conditions for Core of TU Game
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 447-457.

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The system of linear constraints like one that determines the core of TU game is considered. Expressing its basis solutions through characteristic function we obtain a list of sufficient conditions under which the core is nonempty. Some of them are the generalizations of known results.
Keywords: cooperative TU game, core, balancedness, sufficient conditions. 
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Alexandra B. Zinchenko. A Simple Way to Obtain the Sufficient Nonemptiness Conditions for Core of TU Game. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 447-457. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2013_6_a34/

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