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@article{CGTM_2013_6_a31, author = {Artem Sedakov and Elena Parilina and Yury Volobuev and Daria Klimuk}, title = {Existence of {Stable} {Coalition} {Structures} in {Three-person} {Games}}, journal = {Contributions to game theory and management}, pages = {407--422}, publisher = {mathdoc}, volume = {6}, year = {2013}, language = {en}, url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2013_6_a31/} }
TY - JOUR AU - Artem Sedakov AU - Elena Parilina AU - Yury Volobuev AU - Daria Klimuk TI - Existence of Stable Coalition Structures in Three-person Games JO - Contributions to game theory and management PY - 2013 SP - 407 EP - 422 VL - 6 PB - mathdoc UR - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2013_6_a31/ LA - en ID - CGTM_2013_6_a31 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A Artem Sedakov %A Elena Parilina %A Yury Volobuev %A Daria Klimuk %T Existence of Stable Coalition Structures in Three-person Games %J Contributions to game theory and management %D 2013 %P 407-422 %V 6 %I mathdoc %U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2013_6_a31/ %G en %F CGTM_2013_6_a31
Artem Sedakov; Elena Parilina; Yury Volobuev; Daria Klimuk. Existence of Stable Coalition Structures in Three-person Games. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 407-422. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2013_6_a31/
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