Geodesic
Network Game of Pollution Cost Reduction
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 24-34.

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In this paper a $n$-person network game theoretical model of emission reduction is considered. Each player has its own evolution of the stock of accumulated pollution. Dynamics of player $i$, $i=1\dots ,n$ depends on emissions of players $k\in K_i$, where $K_i$ is the set of players which are connected by arcs with player $i$. Nash Equilibrium is constructed. The cooperative game is considered. As optimal imputation the ES-value is supposed. The restriction on network structure to realization the irrational behavior proof condition is deduced.
Keywords: network game, Nash equilibrium, ES-value, imputation destribution procedure, irrational behavior proof condition. 
@article{CGTM_2013_6_a2,
     author = {Anna Belitskaia},
     title = {Network {Game} of {Pollution} {Cost} {Reduction}},
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     volume = {6},
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     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2013_6_a2/}
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Anna Belitskaia. Network Game of Pollution Cost Reduction. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 24-34. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2013_6_a2/

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