Geodesic
Coalitional Solution in a Game Theoretic Model of Territorial Environmental Production
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 231-247.

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A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production under Cournot competition is studied. The process is modeled as cooperative differential game with coalitional structure. The Nash equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is computed and then the value of each coalition is allocated according to some given mechanism between its members. The numerical example is given.
Keywords: optimal control, nonlinear system, dynamic programming. 
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Nadezhda V. Kozlovskaia. Coalitional Solution in a Game Theoretic Model of Territorial Environmental Production. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 6 (2013), pp. 231-247. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2013_6_a16/

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