Geodesic
Static Model of Decision-Making over the Set of Coalitional Partitions
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 5 (2012), pp. 97-106.

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Let be $N$ the set of players and $M$ the set of projects. The coalitional model of decision-making over the set of projects is formalized as family of games with different fixed coalitional partitions for each project that required the adoption of a positive or negative decision by each of the players. The players' strategies are decisions about each of the project. Players can form coalitions in order to obtain higher income. Thus, for each project a coalitional game is defined. In each coalitional game it is required to find in some sense optimal solution. Solving successively each of the coalitional games, we get the set of optimal $n$-tuples for all coalitional games. It is required to find a compromise solution for the choice of a project, i. e. it is required to find a compromise coalitional partition. As an optimality principles are accepted generalized PMS-vector (Grigorieva and Mamkina, 2009, Petrosjan and Mamkina, 2006) and its modifications, and compromise solution.
Keywords: coalitional game, PMS-vector, compromise solution. 
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Xeniya Grigorieva. Static Model of Decision-Making over the Set of Coalitional Partitions. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 5 (2012), pp. 97-106. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2012_5_a9/

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