Geodesic
On Voluntariness of Nash Equilibrium
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 5 (2012), pp. 73-82.

Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

The paper deals with pure strategy equilibria of bi-matrix games. It is argued that the set of Nash equilibria can contain voluntary as well as involuntary outcomes. Only the former are indicative of consistent expectations. In the context of repeated play with incomplete information, simulations show that involuntary equilibria tend to occur more frequently than voluntary equilibria. Consequences in econometric practice and philosophical implications are briefly hinted at.
Keywords: matrix games, expectations, pure equilibria, learning, incomplete information. 
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Paolo Caravani. On Voluntariness of Nash Equilibrium. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 5 (2012), pp. 73-82. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2012_5_a7/

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