On Polytope of (0-1)-normal Big Boss Games: Redundancy and Extreme Points

Alexandra B. Zinchenko

Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 5 (2012), pp. 386-397.

Résumé

The system of non redundant constraints for polytope of monotonic (0-1)-normal big boss games is obtained. The explicit representation of some types of extreme points of this polytope as well as the corresponding Shapley and consensus values formulas are given. We provide the characterization of extreme elements of set of such monotonic (0-1)-normal big boss games that all weak players are symmetric.

Détail

Keywords: cooperative game, big boss game, (0-1)-normal form, extreme points, Shapley value, consensus value.

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