Geodesic
Static Models of Corruption in Hierarchical Control Systems
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 5 (2012), pp. 20-32.

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Static game theoretic models of corruption in two- and three-level control systems and their applications are considered. Some concepts concerned with corruption are formalized. Several model examples are investigated analytically.
Keywords: corruption, hierarchical control systems, hierarchical games, optimization. 
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Andrey A. Antonenko; Guennady A. Ougolnitsky; Anatoly B. Usov. Static Models of Corruption in Hierarchical Control Systems. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 5 (2012), pp. 20-32. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2012_5_a2/

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