Geodesic
Efficient CS-Values Based on Consensus and Shapley Values
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 4 (2011), pp. 502-513.

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Two efficient values for transferable utility games with coalition structure are introduced and axiomatized by means of modified versions of null player property and four standard axioms (efficiency, additivity, external symmetry and internal symmetry). The first value uses the consensus value in game between coalitions and the Shapley value in games within coalitions. The second one uses the consensus and Shapley values in inverse order.
Keywords: coalition structure, coalition value, consensus value, Shapley value, axiomatization. 
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Alexandra B. Zinchenko; Polina P. Provotorova; George V. Mironenko. Efficient CS-Values Based on Consensus and Shapley Values. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 4 (2011), pp. 502-513. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2011_4_a37/

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