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@article{CGTM_2011_4_a35,
author = {Franti\v{s}ek Turnovec},
title = {Strict {Proportional} {Power} and {Fair} {Voting} {Rules} in {Committees}},
journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
pages = {473--488},
publisher = {mathdoc},
volume = {4},
year = {2011},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2011_4_a35/}
}
František Turnovec. Strict Proportional Power and Fair Voting Rules in Committees. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 4 (2011), pp. 473-488. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2011_4_a35/
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