Geodesic
On a Multistage Link Formation Game
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 4 (2011), pp. 368-377.

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In the paper we consider a multistage network game with perfect information. In each stage of the game a network connecting players is given. In our setting we suppose that each network edge connecting two players has utility (utility of the first player from the connection with the second player), and players have the right to change the network structure in each stage. We propose a way of finding an optimal players behavior in this type of multistage game.
Keywords: network, network games, characteristic function, Shapley value, Nash equilibrium. 
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Leon Petrosyan; Artem Sedakov. On a Multistage Link Formation Game. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 4 (2011), pp. 368-377. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2011_4_a27/

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