Geodesic
Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 4 (2011), pp. 19-32.

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We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.
Keywords: Bargaining; Confirmed Proposals; Confirmed Agreement. 
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G. Attanasi; A. García-Gallego; N. Georgantzís; A. Montesano. Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 4 (2011), pp. 19-32. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2011_4_a2/

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