Geodesic
Signaling Managerial Objectives to Elicit Volunteer Effort
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 4 (2011), pp. 231-240.

Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

We examine a nonprofit organization (npo) with a manager and a motivated volunteer, assume that the manager has private information about the volunteer's utility function, that the volunteer has no private information on the manager's utility function, and propose a signaling solution for the volunteer's effort decision. We focus on the general properties of a signal in a npo, specifically taking into account the effects of the volunteer's motivations on the signal. We find that, due to the diversity of volunteer motivations, the set of signals can be large. We relate this to signals that can be used by nonprofit managers in practice and we reinterpret existing practices as signals.
Keywords: signaling; volunteers; nonprofit organizations; motivation, incentives. 
@article{CGTM_2011_4_a17,
     author = {Gert Huybrechts and Jurgen Willems and Marc Jegers and Jemima Bidee and Tim Vantilborgh and Roland Pepermans},
     title = {Signaling {Managerial} {Objectives} to {Elicit} {Volunteer} {Effort}},
     journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
     pages = {231--240},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {4},
     year = {2011},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2011_4_a17/}
}
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Gert Huybrechts
AU  - Jurgen Willems
AU  - Marc Jegers
AU  - Jemima Bidee
AU  - Tim Vantilborgh
AU  - Roland Pepermans
TI  - Signaling Managerial Objectives to Elicit Volunteer Effort
JO  - Contributions to game theory and management
PY  - 2011
SP  - 231
EP  - 240
VL  - 4
PB  - mathdoc
UR  - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2011_4_a17/
LA  - en
ID  - CGTM_2011_4_a17
ER  - 
%0 Journal Article
%A Gert Huybrechts
%A Jurgen Willems
%A Marc Jegers
%A Jemima Bidee
%A Tim Vantilborgh
%A Roland Pepermans
%T Signaling Managerial Objectives to Elicit Volunteer Effort
%J Contributions to game theory and management
%D 2011
%P 231-240
%V 4
%I mathdoc
%U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2011_4_a17/
%G en
%F CGTM_2011_4_a17
Gert Huybrechts; Jurgen Willems; Marc Jegers; Jemima Bidee; Tim Vantilborgh; Roland Pepermans. Signaling Managerial Objectives to Elicit Volunteer Effort. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 4 (2011), pp. 231-240. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2011_4_a17/

[1] Allen F., Gale D., “Measurement Distortion and Missing contingencies in Optimal Contracts”, Economic theory, 1:1 (1992), 1–26 | DOI

[2] Bënabou R., Tirole J., “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation”, The Review of Economic Studies, 70:3 (2003), 616–636 | DOI

[3] Besley T., Ghatak M., “Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents”, American Economic Review, 95:3 (2005), 616–636 | DOI

[4] Caers R., Du Bois C., De Gieter S., De Cooman R., Pepermans R., “A Micro-economic Perspective on Manager Selection in Nonprofit Organizations”, European Journal of Operational Research, 192:1 (2009), 173–197 | DOI

[5] Clary E., Snyder M., Stukas M., “Volunteers' Motivations: Findings from a National Survey”, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 25:4 (1995), 486–505

[6] Ellingsen T., Johannesson M., “Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory”, American Economic Review, 98:3 (2008), 990–1008 | DOI

[7] Falk A., Kosfeld M., “The Hidden Costs of Control”, American Economic Review, 96:5 (2006), 1611–1630 | DOI

[8] Fehr E., Falk A., “Psychological Foundations of Incentives”, European Economic Review, 46:4–5 (2006), 687–724

[9] Frey B., Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 1997

[10] Frey B., Jegen R., “Motivation Crowding Theory”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 15:5 (2001), 687–724 | DOI

[11] Gibbons R., “Incentives in Organizations”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 15:5 (1998), 687–724

[12] Inderst R., “Incentive Schemes as a Signaling Device”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 44:4 (2001), 445–465 | DOI

[13] Kreps D., “Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives”, American Economic Review, 87:2 (1998), 359–364

[14] Murdock K., “Intrinsic Motivation and Optimal Incentive Contracts”, RAND Journal of Economics, 33:4 (2002), 650–671 | DOI

[15] Prendergast C., “The Provision of Incentives in Firms”, Journal of Economic Literature, 37:1 (1999), 7–63 | DOI

[16] Ryan R., Deci E., “Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being”, American Psychologist, 55:1 (2000), 68–78 | DOI

[17] Slikwa D., “Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes”, American Economic Review, 97:3 (2007), 999–1012 | DOI

[18] Speckbacher G., “The Economics of Performance Management in Nonprofit Organizations”, Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 13:3 (2003), 267–281 | DOI

[19] Spier K., “Incomplete Contracts and Signalling”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 23:3 (1992), 432–443 | DOI

[20] Suazo M., Martinez P., Sandoval R., “Creating Psychological and Legal Contracts through Human Resource Practices: A Signaling Theory Perspective”, Resource Management Review, 19:2 (2009), 154–166 | DOI