Geodesic
How Hierarchical Structures Impact on Competition and Taxation
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 91-103.

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Stackelberg models for hierarchical oligopolistic markets with a homogenous product were studied by researchers extensively. The goal of this paper is to extend the classical solution in closed form of the Stackelberg model for a general hierarchical structures composed by firms arranged into groups of different hierarchical levels and to find optimal tax rate for this model. 
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Alexsandr Galegov; Andrey Garnaev. How Hierarchical Structures Impact on Competition and Taxation. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 91-103. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2010_3_a8/

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