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@article{CGTM_2010_3_a33, author = {Xiaojian Zhao}, title = {Formal {Epistemology:} {A} {Survey}}, journal = {Contributions to game theory and management}, pages = {441--457}, publisher = {mathdoc}, volume = {3}, year = {2010}, language = {en}, url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2010_3_a33/} }
Xiaojian Zhao. Formal Epistemology: A Survey. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 441-457. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2010_3_a33/
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