Formal Epistemology: A Survey
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 441-457
Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru
The paper surveys theoretical developments in formal epistemology. We discuss knowledge operator, and its role in game theory. Then we introduce imperfect knowledge from bounded rationality perspective. Lastly, we discuss unawareness, and its negative result.
Keywords:
epistemology, knowledge, games, unawareness.
@article{CGTM_2010_3_a33,
author = {Xiaojian Zhao},
title = {Formal {Epistemology:} {A} {Survey}},
journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
pages = {441--457},
year = {2010},
volume = {3},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2010_3_a33/}
}
Xiaojian Zhao. Formal Epistemology: A Survey. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 441-457. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2010_3_a33/
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