Geodesic
Generalized Kernels and Bargainig Sets for Cooperative Games with Limited Communication Structure
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 289-302

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For a fixed undirected connected graph $\varphi$ with a node set $N$, we study generalized kernels and bargaining sets for cooperative games $(N,v)$, where players are able to cooperate only if they can form a connected subgraph in graph $\varphi$. We consider generalizations of Aumann–Maschler theory of the bargaining set and the kernel, where objections and counter-objections are defined between coalitions from a fixed collection of coalitions $\mathcal{A}$. Two problems are solved in this paper. Necessary and sufficient condition on $\mathcal{A}$, which ensures that each TU-game $(N,v)$ would have a nonempty $\varphi $-restricted generalized kernel $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}(N,v)$ is obtained. For two different generalizations of bargaining sets, we obtained necessary and sufficient conditions on $\varphi$, which ensure that each game $(N,v)$ would have nonempty $\varphi $-restricted generalized $\mathcal{A}$-bargaining set for each $\varphi$-permissible collection $\mathcal{A}$.
Keywords: cooperative games, kernel, bargaining set, limited communication. 
@article{CGTM_2010_3_a22,
     author = {Natalia Naumova and Irina Korman},
     title = {Generalized {Kernels} and {Bargainig} {Sets} for {Cooperative} {Games} with {Limited} {Communication} {Structure}},
     journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
     pages = {289--302},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {3},
     year = {2010},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2010_3_a22/}
}
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Natalia Naumova; Irina Korman. Generalized Kernels and Bargainig Sets for Cooperative Games with Limited Communication Structure. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 289-302. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2010_3_a22/