Geodesic
D.\,W.\,K.~Yeung's Condition for the Coalitional Solution of the Game of Pollution Cost Reduction
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 171-181.

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In this paper the problem of allocation over time of total cost incurred by coalitions of countries in a coalitional game of pollution reduction is considered. The Nash equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is computed and then the value of each coalition is allocated according to some given mechanism between its members. Obtained solution is time consistent and satisfies the irrational-behavior-proofness condition.
Keywords: differential game, cooperative game, dynamic programming, Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation, Shapley value, Nash equilibrium, time-consistency, irrational-behavior-proofness condition. 
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Anna V. Iljina; Nadezhda V. Kozlovskaya. D.\,W.\,K.~Yeung's Condition for the Coalitional Solution of the Game of Pollution Cost Reduction. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 171-181. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2010_3_a14/

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