Geodesic
Construction of Different Types of Dynamics in an Evolutionary Model of Trades in the Stock Market
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 162-170.

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The main purpose of this work is research of the agents behavior on the stock market using methods of evolutionary game theory and construct evolutionary dynamics for the long-run period. For this model we considered and compared some additional cases of the dynamics. Following dynamics for the model were constructed: the evolutionary dynamics, the OLG dynamics and continuous dynamics of the imitation behavior. As a result we compared solutions, which were given by all dynamics.
Keywords: Evolutionary game, ESS strategy, stock market, cheap-talk game, replicative dynamic, discrete dynamics, imitation models, imitation dynamics. 
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Elena Gubar. Construction of Different Types of Dynamics in an Evolutionary Model of Trades in the Stock Market. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 3 (2010), pp. 162-170. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2010_3_a13/

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