Geodesic
Compliance Pervasion and the Evolution of Norms: the Game of Deterrence Approach
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 2 (2009), pp. 383-414.

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Keywords: compliance, culture, deterrence, evolutionary stability, game, norm, pervasion, playability, posture, strategy. 
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Michel Rudnianski; Huo Su; David Ellison. Compliance Pervasion and the Evolution of Norms: the Game of Deterrence Approach. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 2 (2009), pp. 383-414. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2009_2_a30/

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