Geodesic
Studying Cooperative Games Using the Method of Agencies
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 2 (2009), pp. 294-306.

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John F. Nash. Studying Cooperative Games Using the Method of Agencies. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 2 (2009), pp. 294-306. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2009_2_a23/

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