The Environment Protecting Dynamics. An Evolutionary Game Theory approach

Paloma Zapata-Lillo

Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 1 (2007), pp. 539-555

Résumé

The action of large human conglomerates is behind many of the environmental catastrophes in the last decades. However, these same conglomerates are the main actors in some important environment-protection battles. People might lead to the construction of social organizations, and achieve a kind of accumulation of a protecting stock (laws, protocols, social conscience, etc). Frequently, those social movements grow up and become strong, but they do not remain forever, they often follow a kind of cycle. We study emergence and dynamics of social organizations through the repetition of a game in an evolutionary context. The history of the conflict goes through stages. The reached stochastic stable equilibrium in each stage determines which organization is formed, and which is the accumulated stock in next stage, leading a new game, and new equilibria.

Détail

Keywords: Prisoner Dilemma, Public Good, Organization that Forces cooperation, Organization Game, Strict Nash Equilibria, Learning Dynamics, Myopic People, Sample of Information, Mistakes, Markov Process, Perturbation, Stochastically Stable Equilibria, Accumulation, Learning-Accumulation Dynamics, Depreciation.