Geodesic
Multiple Membership and Federal Structures
Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 1 (2007), pp. 286-293.

Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

We consider a model of the “world” with several regions that may create a unified entity or be partitioned into several unions (countries). The regions have distinct preferences over policies chosen in the country to which they belong and equally share the cost of public policies. It is known that stable “political maps” or country partitions, that do not admit a threat of secession by any group of regions, may fail to exist. To rectify this problem, in line with the recent trend for an increased autonomy and various regional arrangements, we consider federal structures, where a region can simultaneously be a part of several unions. We show that, under very general conditions, there always exists a stable federal structure.
Keywords: Partitions, Federal Structures, Stability, Cooperative games. 
@article{CGTM_2007_1_a17,
     author = {Michel Le Breton and Valery Makarov and Alexei Savvateev and Shlomo Weber},
     title = {Multiple {Membership} and {Federal} {Structures}},
     journal = {Contributions to game theory and management},
     pages = {286--293},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {1},
     year = {2007},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2007_1_a17/}
}
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Michel Le Breton
AU  - Valery Makarov
AU  - Alexei Savvateev
AU  - Shlomo Weber
TI  - Multiple Membership and Federal Structures
JO  - Contributions to game theory and management
PY  - 2007
SP  - 286
EP  - 293
VL  - 1
PB  - mathdoc
UR  - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2007_1_a17/
LA  - en
ID  - CGTM_2007_1_a17
ER  - 
%0 Journal Article
%A Michel Le Breton
%A Valery Makarov
%A Alexei Savvateev
%A Shlomo Weber
%T Multiple Membership and Federal Structures
%J Contributions to game theory and management
%D 2007
%P 286-293
%V 1
%I mathdoc
%U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2007_1_a17/
%G en
%F CGTM_2007_1_a17
Michel Le Breton; Valery Makarov; Alexei Savvateev; Shlomo Weber. Multiple Membership and Federal Structures. Contributions to game theory and management, Tome 1 (2007), pp. 286-293. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/CGTM_2007_1_a17/

[1] Alesina A., Spolaore E., “On the number and size of nations”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (1997), 1027–1056 | DOI

[2] Alesina A., Angeloni I., Etro F., “International unions”, American Economic Review, 95 (2005), 602–615 | DOI

[3] Bogomolnaia A., Le Breton M., Savvateev A., Weber S., “Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules”, Economic Theory, 2007

[4] Casella A., “The role of market size in the formation of jurisdictions”, Review of Economic Studies, 68 (2001), 83–108 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[5] Danilov V. I., “On the Scarf theorem”, Economics and Mathematical Methods, 35:3 (1999), 137–139 (in Russian) | MR

[6] Haimanko O., Le Breton M., Weber S., “Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability”, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (2004), 1277–1303 | DOI

[7] Jéhiel P., Scotchmer S., “Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation”, Review of Economic Studies, 68 (2001), 393–413 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[8] Makarov V. L., “Calculus of Institutions”, Economics and Mathematical Methods, 39:2 (1999), 14–32 (in Russian)

[9] Scarf H. E., “The core of an $N$-person game”, Econometrica, 35 (1967), 50–69 | DOI | MR | Zbl