Geodesic
Bilateral Rules as Complex Rules
Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Tome 52 (2023) no. 3, pp. 329-375.

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Proof-theoretic semantics is an inferentialist theory of meaning originally developed in a unilateral framework. Its extension to bilateral systems opens both opportunities and problems. The problems are caused especially by Coordination Principles (a kind of rule that is not present in unilateral systems) and mismatches between rules for assertion and rules for rejection. In this paper, a solution is proposed for two major issues: the availability of a reduction procedure for tonk and the existence of harmonious rules for the paradoxical zero-ary connective ∙. The solution is based on a reinterpretation of bilateral rules as complex rules, that is, rules that introduce or eliminate connectives in a subordinate position. Looking at bilateral rules from this perspective, the problems faced by bilateralism can be seen as special cases of general problems of complex systems, which have been already analyzed in the literature. In the end, a comparison with other proposed solutions underlines the need for further investigation in order to complete the picture of bilateral proof-theoretic semantics.
Keywords: bilateralism, separability, harmony 
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Ceragioli, Leonardo. Bilateral Rules as Complex Rules. Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Tome 52 (2023) no. 3, pp. 329-375. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/BSL_2023_52_3_a2/

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