The irrelevant information principle for collective probabilistic reasoning
Kybernetika, Tome 50 (2014) no. 2, pp. 175-188
Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Czech Digital Mathematics Library
Within the framework of discrete probabilistic uncertain reasoning a large literature exists justifying the maximum entropy inference process, $\operatorname{\mathbf{ME}}$, as being optimal in the context of a single agent whose subjective probabilistic knowledge base is consistent. In particular Paris and Vencovská completely characterised the $\operatorname{\mathbf{ME}}$ inference process by means of an attractive set of axioms which an inference process should satisfy. More recently the second author extended the Paris-Vencovská axiomatic approach to inference processes in the context of several agents whose subjective probabilistic knowledge bases, while individually consistent, may be collectively inconsistent. In particular he defined a natural multi-agent extension of the inference process $\operatorname{\mathbf{ME}}$ called the social entropy process, $\operatorname{\mathbf{SEP}}$. However, while $\operatorname{\mathbf{SEP}}$ has been shown to possess many attractive properties, those which are known are almost certainly insufficient to uniquely characterise it. It is therefore of particular interest to study those Paris-Vencovská principles valid for $\operatorname{\mathbf{ME}}$ whose immediate generalisations to the multi-agent case are not satisfied by $\operatorname{\mathbf{SEP}}$. One of these principles is the Irrelevant Information Principle, a powerful and appealing principle which very few inference processes satisfy even in the single agent context. In this paper we will investigate whether $\operatorname{\mathbf{SEP}}$ can satisfy an interesting modified generalisation of this principle.
Within the framework of discrete probabilistic uncertain reasoning a large literature exists justifying the maximum entropy inference process, $\operatorname{\mathbf{ME}}$, as being optimal in the context of a single agent whose subjective probabilistic knowledge base is consistent. In particular Paris and Vencovská completely characterised the $\operatorname{\mathbf{ME}}$ inference process by means of an attractive set of axioms which an inference process should satisfy. More recently the second author extended the Paris-Vencovská axiomatic approach to inference processes in the context of several agents whose subjective probabilistic knowledge bases, while individually consistent, may be collectively inconsistent. In particular he defined a natural multi-agent extension of the inference process $\operatorname{\mathbf{ME}}$ called the social entropy process, $\operatorname{\mathbf{SEP}}$. However, while $\operatorname{\mathbf{SEP}}$ has been shown to possess many attractive properties, those which are known are almost certainly insufficient to uniquely characterise it. It is therefore of particular interest to study those Paris-Vencovská principles valid for $\operatorname{\mathbf{ME}}$ whose immediate generalisations to the multi-agent case are not satisfied by $\operatorname{\mathbf{SEP}}$. One of these principles is the Irrelevant Information Principle, a powerful and appealing principle which very few inference processes satisfy even in the single agent context. In this paper we will investigate whether $\operatorname{\mathbf{SEP}}$ can satisfy an interesting modified generalisation of this principle.
DOI :
10.14736/kyb-2014-2-0175
Classification :
03B42, 03B48, 60A99, 68T37, 94A17
Keywords: uncertain reasoning; discrete probability function; social inference process; maximum entropy; Kullback–Leibler; irrelevant information principle
Keywords: uncertain reasoning; discrete probability function; social inference process; maximum entropy; Kullback–Leibler; irrelevant information principle
@article{10_14736_kyb_2014_2_0175,
author = {Adam\v{c}{\'\i}k, Martin and Wilmers, George},
title = {The irrelevant information principle for collective probabilistic reasoning},
journal = {Kybernetika},
pages = {175--188},
year = {2014},
volume = {50},
number = {2},
doi = {10.14736/kyb-2014-2-0175},
mrnumber = {3216989},
zbl = {1297.68221},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/articles/10.14736/kyb-2014-2-0175/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - Adamčík, Martin AU - Wilmers, George TI - The irrelevant information principle for collective probabilistic reasoning JO - Kybernetika PY - 2014 SP - 175 EP - 188 VL - 50 IS - 2 UR - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/articles/10.14736/kyb-2014-2-0175/ DO - 10.14736/kyb-2014-2-0175 LA - en ID - 10_14736_kyb_2014_2_0175 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A Adamčík, Martin %A Wilmers, George %T The irrelevant information principle for collective probabilistic reasoning %J Kybernetika %D 2014 %P 175-188 %V 50 %N 2 %U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/articles/10.14736/kyb-2014-2-0175/ %R 10.14736/kyb-2014-2-0175 %G en %F 10_14736_kyb_2014_2_0175
Adamčík, Martin; Wilmers, George. The irrelevant information principle for collective probabilistic reasoning. Kybernetika, Tome 50 (2014) no. 2, pp. 175-188. doi: 10.14736/kyb-2014-2-0175
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