We consider an extension of the Kyle and Back’s model [Back, Rev. Finance Stud. 5 (1992) 387-409; Kyle, Econometrica 35 (1985) 1315-1335], meaning a model for the market with a continuous time risky asset and asymmetrical information. There are three financial agents: the market maker, an insider trader (who knows a random variable which will be revealed at final time) and a non informed agent. Here we assume that the non informed agent is strategic, namely he/she uses a utility function to optimize his/her strategy. Optimal control theory is applied to obtain a pricing rule and to prove the existence of an equilibrium price when the insider trader and the non informed agent are risk-neutral. We will show that if such an equilibrium exists, then the non informed agent’s optimal strategy is to do nothing, in other words to be non strategic.
Keywords: equilibrium, optimal control, asymmetric information
@article{PS_2007__11__80_0,
author = {Ogawa, Shigeyoshi and Pontier, Monique},
title = {Pricing rules under asymmetric information},
journal = {ESAIM: Probability and Statistics},
pages = {80--88},
year = {2007},
publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
volume = {11},
doi = {10.1051/ps:2007007},
mrnumber = {2299648},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/articles/10.1051/ps:2007007/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - Ogawa, Shigeyoshi AU - Pontier, Monique TI - Pricing rules under asymmetric information JO - ESAIM: Probability and Statistics PY - 2007 SP - 80 EP - 88 VL - 11 PB - EDP-Sciences UR - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/articles/10.1051/ps:2007007/ DO - 10.1051/ps:2007007 LA - en ID - PS_2007__11__80_0 ER -
Ogawa, Shigeyoshi; Pontier, Monique. Pricing rules under asymmetric information. ESAIM: Probability and Statistics, Tome 11 (2007), pp. 80-88. doi: 10.1051/ps:2007007
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