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Contributions to game theory and management
Tome 6 (2013)
Précédent
Suivant
Preface
Leon A. Petrosyan
;
Nikolay A. Zenkevich
p. 6-7
The Lexmax Rule for Bankruptcy Problems
Javier Arin
;
Juan M. Benito-Ostolaza
p. 8-23
Network Game of Pollution Cost Reduction
Anna Belitskaia
p. 24-34
A Model of Coopetitive Game and the Greek Crisis
David Carfi
;
Daniele Schilirò
p. 35-62
Dynamic Models of Corruption in Hierarchical Control Systems
Andrey A. Chernushkin
;
Guennady A. Ougolnitsky
;
Anatoly B. Usov
p. 63-74
When it Pays to Think about the Competition, and When it Doesn’t: Exploring Overconfidence Bias in Dynamic Games
Jennifer Cutler
;
Richard Staelin
p. 75-88
A Survey on Discrete Bidding Games with Asymmetric Information
Victor Domansky
;
Victoria Kreps
;
Marina Sandomirskaia
p. 89-114
Playability Properties in Games of Deterrence and Evolution in the Replicator Dynamics
David Ellison
;
Michel Rudnianski
p. 115-133
Consistency to the Values for Games in Generalized Characteristic Function Form
Yuan Feng
;
Theo S. H. Driessen
;
Georg Still
p. 134-145
Analysing the Folk Theorem for Linked Repeated Games
Henk Folmer
;
Pierre von Mouche
p. 146-164
Service Quality’s Effects on the Selection of a Partner Airline in the Formation of Airline Alliances
J. Fu
;
S. Muto
p. 165-177
Coalitional Model of Decision-Making over the Set of Projects with Different Preferences of Players
Xeniya Grigorieva
p. 178-188
Decision Making Procedure in Optimal Control Problem for the SIR Model
Elena Gubar
;
Ekaterina Zhitkova
p. 189-199
A New Characterization of the Pre-Kernel for TU Games Through its Indirect Function and its Application to Determine the Nucleolus for Three Subclasses of TU Games
Dongshuang Hou
;
Theo Driessen
;
Antoni Meseguer-Artola
;
Bolgárka Mosoni
p. 200-210
Game-Theoretic Models of Collaboration among Economic Agents
Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy
;
Alexandra S. Malova
p. 211-221
Differential Games with Random Terminal Instants
Sergey Kostyunin
p. 222-230
Coalitional Solution in a Game Theoretic Model of Territorial Environmental Production
Nadezhda V. Kozlovskaia
p. 231-247
On a Mutual Tracking Block for the Real Object and its Virtual Model-Leader
Andrew N. Krasovskii
p. 248-252
Game-Theoretic Model on a Cognitive Map and its Tolerance to Errors in Input Data to Analyze a Conflict of Interests Between Russia and Norway in Barents Sea
Sergei G. Kulivets
p. 253-263
The Strategy of Tax Control in Conditions of Possible Mistakes and Corruption of Inspectors
Suriya Sh. Kumacheva
p. 264-273
Asymmetric Equilibria in Stahl Search Model
Sergey Kuniavsky
p. 274-288
Differential Bargaining Games as Microfoundations for Production Function
Vladimir Matveenko
p. 289-300
Pricing and Transportation Costs in Queueing System
Anna V. Mazalova
p. 301-306
Optimal Strategies in the Game with Arbitrator
Alexander E. Mentcher
p. 307-315
Solidary Solutions to Games with Restricted Cooperation
Natalia Naumova
p. 316-337
On an Algorithm for Nash Equilibria Determination in the Informational Extended Bimatrix Games
Ludmila Novac
p. 338-350
Forest Situations and Cost Monotonic Solutions
O. Palancı
;
S. Z. Alparslan Gök
;
G.-W. Weber
p. 351-361
Two Approaches for Solving a Group Pursuit Game
Yaroslavna B. Pankratova
;
Svetlana I. Tarashnina
p. 362-376
Entering of Newcomer in the Perturbed Voting Game
Ovanes L. Petrosian
p. 377-387
Strategic Support of Cooperative Solutions in 2-Person Differential Games with Dependent Motions
Leon Petrosyan
;
Sergey Chistyakov
p. 388-394
A Construction of Preference Relation for Models of Decision Making with Quality Criteria
Victor V. Rozen
p. 395-406
Existence of Stable Coalition Structures in Three-person Games
Artem Sedakov
;
Elena Parilina
;
Yury Volobuev
;
Daria Klimuk
p. 407-422
The Algorithm of Finding Equilibrium in the Class of Fully-mixed Strategies in the Logistics Market with Big Losses
Anna A. Sergeeva
;
Vladimir M. Bure
p. 423-433
Polar Representation of Shapley Value: Nonatomic Polynomial Games
Valeri A. Vasil'ev
p. 434-446
A Simple Way to Obtain the Sufficient Nonemptiness Conditions for Core of TU Game
Alexandra B. Zinchenko
p. 447-457