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The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions
Žurnal vyčislitelʹnoj matematiki i matematičeskoj fiziki, Tome 41 (2001) no. 3, pp. 374-383 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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A. D. Khalezov. The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions. Žurnal vyčislitelʹnoj matematiki i matematičeskoj fiziki, Tome 41 (2001) no. 3, pp. 374-383. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/ZVMMF_2001_41_3_a3/

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