The general solution to the principal-agent problem with asymmetrical information under uncertainty and risk

A. F. Kononenko ; A. D. Khalezov

Žurnal vyčislitelʹnoj matematiki i matematičeskoj fiziki, Tome 40 (2000) no. 4, pp. 532-545

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