Behavioral Influences on Strategic Interactions Outcomes in Game Theory Models
Yugoslav journal of operations research, Tome 31 (2021) no. 1, p. 3
Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source eLibrary of Mathematical Institute of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Traditional decision-making models assume full rationality of all actors.
Nevertheless, the practice has shown that the behavior and choices of actors are influenced by many factors such as motives, beliefs, opinions, personal and social preferences,
as well as cognitive biases. Moreover, it has already been proven that people have limitations in their ability to collect relevant information and respond to them, i.e., they
are bounded rational. All this has contributed to the development of behavioral models
in many disciplines including game theory. This paper provides a detailed review of the
literature regarding behavioral models of strategic decision making. Bounded rationality
and other cognitive biases in the strategic interactions are illustrated through the findings
of numerous experimental studies.
Classification :
91A26, 91A90
Keywords: Behavioral Game Theory, Cognitive Biases, Social Preferences, Bounded Rationality, Experimental Games
Keywords: Behavioral Game Theory, Cognitive Biases, Social Preferences, Bounded Rationality, Experimental Games
@article{YJOR_2021_31_1_a0,
author = {Marija Kuzmanovi\'c},
title = {Behavioral {Influences} on {Strategic} {Interactions} {Outcomes} in {Game} {Theory} {Models}},
journal = {Yugoslav journal of operations research},
pages = {3 },
year = {2021},
volume = {31},
number = {1},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/YJOR_2021_31_1_a0/}
}
Marija Kuzmanović. Behavioral Influences on Strategic Interactions Outcomes in Game Theory Models. Yugoslav journal of operations research, Tome 31 (2021) no. 1, p. 3 . http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/YJOR_2021_31_1_a0/