Endogenous Royalty Factor in a Licensing Contract
Yugoslav journal of operations research, Tome 26 (2016) no. 3, p. 263
Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source eLibrary of Mathematical Institute of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
The owner of a well known fashion brand grants a manufacturer the
rights to produce and sell a second-line brand against a percentage of the sales
called royalty. To this end, the brand owner and the manufacturer sign a licensing
contract which assigns the owner, who has already determined his advertising
campaign, the right of determining the royalty factor. The manufacturer will
plan her advertising campaign for the licensed product in order to maximize her
profit. The brand owner’s objective is twofold: on the one hand, he wants to
maximize the profit coming from the contract, on the other hand, he wants to
improve the value of the brand at the end of a given planning period. We model
this interaction between the two agents using a Stackelberg game, where the
brand owner is the leader and the manufacturer is the follower. We characterize
the royalty percentage and the licensee’s advertising effort which constitute the
unique Stackelberg equilibrium of the game.
Classification :
90B60, 49N90, 91A65
Keywords: OR in Marketing, Licensing, Advertising, Stackelberg Game.
Keywords: OR in Marketing, Licensing, Advertising, Stackelberg Game.
@article{YJOR_2016_26_3_a0,
author = {Alessandra Buratto and Luca Grosset and Bruno Viscolani},
title = {Endogenous {Royalty} {Factor} in a {Licensing} {Contract}},
journal = {Yugoslav journal of operations research},
pages = {263 },
year = {2016},
volume = {26},
number = {3},
language = {en},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/YJOR_2016_26_3_a0/}
}
Alessandra Buratto; Luca Grosset; Bruno Viscolani. Endogenous Royalty Factor in a Licensing Contract. Yugoslav journal of operations research, Tome 26 (2016) no. 3, p. 263 . http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/YJOR_2016_26_3_a0/